Thinking Through the Crisis of Intra-Party Democracy in Kenya: Reflections on Kenyatta's KANU Leadership (1963-1978)

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Abstract

Purpose: This paper explores the tripodic relation in Kenya from 1963 to 1978 between party leadership, intra-party crisis, and democratic consolidation.

Methodology: It relies on the collection and analysis of primary and secondary data materials. Using elite and practical group conflict theories as theoretical frameworks, the study states that KANU's intra-party crises during the Kenyatta regime were due to the high-handedness of party leadership and political elites at various levels of the party structure, as well as their inability to establish stable and coherent party ties coupled with the abysmal level of intra-party democracy and weak party discipline.

Findings: The study concludes that the intra-party crises frequently sparked by incompetent and power-drunk party leaders must be substantially curbed for Kenya's democracy to stand the test of time and achieve the consolidation it deserves.

A unique contribution to theory, practice and policy: The activity of democratic government relies heavily on political parties. In democracies, parties are the structures that coordinate political rivalry and policymaking. Given the importance of parties in politics, political scientists have long sought to comprehend how they are formed and sustained, as well as the interests and functions they represent. Different party theories offer different answers to these questions, resulting in different predictions about party activity and its role in improving democratic transparency and responsiveness (Moffett,2007). The elite and rational group conflict theory (RGCT) is an intergroup conflict social psychology model. For this analysis, the theory describes how political parties can become hostile as a result of competing goals and power struggles. It also explains why intergroup animosity is accompanied by feelings of racism and bigotry against other political parties. The theory contributes significantly to our interpretation of party politics, reviving critical debates in Kenya about the limits of democratic responsiveness. It emphasizes the importance of party leaders as key players in the formation of each party (Leeson & Harris, 2018). At the same time, emphasizes the importance of political party internal organization as anchors and guardians against the irrational power of political elites. Changes in party organization, according to Aldrich, are significant, but they should be viewed as attempts to address the evolving issues that face the

politicians at the center of a party. As a result, parties are ultimately the creations of politicians in reaction to shifting desires (Aldrich,1971). However, the theory leaves a host of theoretical and empirical questions unanswered. More specifically, we argue that future party theorizing must account for voters' unique roles and capacities, as well as reengage the concept of structured parties as hierarchical intermediaries between communities, politicians, and voters. It recommends, among other things, that party leaders/executives exercise restraint in their use of power, create an effective intra-party crisis resolution process, and ensure that all party leaders and members adhere to party internal democracy, constitutions, and guidelines (Leeson & Harris, 2018).

INTRODUCTION

Political parties have been vulnerable to crises of various kinds since the nationalist movements were declared in Kenya in the 1920s, which in turn undermined their democratic roles and still undermines them. Intrigues, internal conflict, factionalism, schisms, and internal conflicts have been the defining features of party politics in Kenya, since the colonial era through independence, resulting in a series of crises, defections, and counter-defections, as well as the decline of some of these parties (Markoff, 2015).

The second republic had high hopes and aspirations that Kenyan leaders had learned from their mistakes in the past, but the fact proved otherwise. Since 2002, party politics has been afflicted by crises of varying degrees, with more crises than stability, such that nearly all of the country's political parties are continually embroiled in internal crises. In the new democratic dispensation, this is the situation with major political groups, including Kenya African National Union (KANU) the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), the Jubilee Alliance Party, and the Reform for the Restoration of Democracy Kenya (FORD Kenya), as well as minor national political parties (Maiyo, 2008).

However, scholars have advanced different factors responsible for strained relations between members of KANU, such as prebendal politics, lack of viable party ideology, lack of internal democracy, candidate imposition, money politics, party indiscipline, and ethnicisation of party politics, among others, which have increased intense struggle over party power control (Joseph, 2014). There is however a lack of scholarly attention on the intra-party crisis in KANU capable of truncating the developing democracy of Kenya. Against this backdrop, this paper examined the dynamics of intra-party democracy in KANU from 1963 to 1978 and its implications on democratic consolidation in Kenya (Nwagwu, 2018).

Statement of the Problem

Political parties have played an important role in Kenya's democratic transition, articulating popular concerns and negotiating new political systems between differing political ideologies. Though there have been a few studies on Kenyan governance and transition politics, none have

focused on KANU's democratic conduct as a pioneer political party, even though the party has been plagued by internal disputes, disintegration, and declining popularity since independence. KANU was often accused of being guided by force rather than philosophy or theory, with no clear indication of which ideologies it supported. There were inconsistencies between the principles and intent of her legal documents. In comparison to political parties that formed in Kenya after 1991, KANU's popularity has dwindled. It's not surprising, then, that fundamental questions about KANU's internal democracy remain unanswered as a historical and political issue in Kenya.

METHODOLOGY

The results of this research paper are focused on key informant interviews conducted in Kenya with Kenya African National Union (KANU) officials and long-serving members to provide a within-case study of intra-party democracy at the party and national levels. The study relied on qualitative data collection methods. The majority of the empirical evidence was gathered from primary sources using open-ended questions. On the one hand, primary data was gathered from leaders and party technocrats, and on the other hand, experts and commentators.

Structured in-depth interviews with leading party leaders and delegates or spokespersons provided the majority of comprehensive party information on internal systems, decision-making processes, and institutional set-up. Unstructured interviews with experts such as political analysts, critics, authors, and scholars were also conducted to obtain alternate facts, viewpoints, and perspectives outside of the political actors to improve the validity of the research's findings and conclusions. Secondary data came from written research papers, journals, and official documents including the constitution, bills, and Acts of Parliament. Data from organized questionnaires was augmented by data from party documents such as constitutions, manifestos, rule books, strategic plans, and annual reports, which focused on institutional frameworks and standardized procedures and processes within political parties.

THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS

This research is focused on the theory of elite and rational group conflict theory (RGCT). In current literature, elite theory traceable to Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941), Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923), and Robert Michels (1876-1936) have been adopted to explain the dominance of minority power on the majority in any country, society or organizations like political parties that inevitably leads to conflict and ultimately causes a crisis. The core tenets of elite theory are that political power is concentrated in the hands of a minority group that "performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, according to Lopez (2013).

Elite theorists claim that the political class/elite minority groups often seek to out-organize and outwit broad majorities in society. In other words, the affairs of society are guided by a particular group of people and their children may take over from them and it continues in that circle (Moliki, 2020). Besides, the scholars maintain that elites alternate in power either peacefully or in violent rivalry, which typically leads to factions, anarchy, conflicts, and crises, and often conflict within political parties between these elites and non-elites.

In line with these positions, the character demonstrated by the political elite in KANU throughout 1963 to 1978 is that power should always be centralized in their hands alone and crises erupt when another individual (elite or non-elite) competes or challenges such power. KANU party, therefore, exhibited practices where party leaders/patrons frequently settled for candidate selection rather than election, compliance rather than qualification, personal interest rather than national interest, based on their shared history and priorities (Diamond, 2002; Ani Kifordu, 2011). Thus, without regard to the desires and expectations of other party members, KANU leaders run the affairs of the party mainly on their aggrandizement leading to intra-party conflicts between leaders like Oginga Odinga who claimed that the only way to change the status quo was to oppose the actions of such leaders like Kenyatta and Tom Mboya, thereby overheating the party system.

The failure of party leaders and/or executives (elite) to handle the conflict or different interests within KANU typically frustrated intra-party democracy. This is because, as different factions in the party acquired the desired political power and wealth within KANU, other groups attempted similarly to gain the same or similar advantages, and since the winning group always attempted to assume the winner-takes-all pattern, the struggle and rivalry to achieve the same objectives and goals then become tense, acrimonious and bitter, so intra-party conflict was inevitable. The East-west divide that characterized politics in KANU was intensive coupled with personality rivalry over the balance of power. Kenyatta was not only suspicious of Odinga over his communist stand, but he was increasingly concerned about Mboya's prominence. He, therefore, worked with the radicals in his party to control Mboya and Odinga and their allies (Anyang'Nyong'o,1989). Therefore, to avoid democratic retrogression or regression, the stakeholders must put in place punitive measures to curb needless internal crises within political parties (Joseph, 2014).

Party Politics and Intra-Party Crisis in Kenya

Within Kenya, Kenyatta was dubbed "Father of the Country" and given the unofficial title of Mzee, which means "grand old man" in Swahili. From 1963 to his death, Kenyatta was surrounded by a cult of personality that purposefully connected Kenyan nationalism with his personality. The use of Kenyatta as a common emblem of the country was aided by the fact that their names are nearly identical (Maloba, 2017). He was viewed as a father figure by Africans in general, not only Kikuyu and Kenyans. Kenyatta became "the most respected post-independence African leader" on the world stage after 1963, according to Maloba, and was praised as a "beloved elder statesman" by Western countries. Both conservative African politicians and Western leaders "highly respected" his views. His anti-communist positions gained favour in the West after he became Kenya's president, and he received awards from numerous pro-Western governments; in 1965, for example, he received medals from both Pope Paul VI and the South Korean government (Lonsdale, 2006).

Arnold described Kenyatta as "one of the outstanding African leaders now alive" in 1974, describing him as "synonymous with Kenya" (Kirkman, 1974). He went on to say that Kenyatta was "one of the continent's most astute politicians" and "one of the great architects of African nationalist achievement since 1945." Kenneth Nyangena called him "one of the greatest men of the twentieth century," saying he was "a light, a rallying point for oppressed Kenyans to fight for their rights, justice, and freedom," and that his "brilliance brought power and aspiration to people

beyond the borders of Kenya" (Nyangena, 2003). He was dubbed "one of the iconic founders of modern African nationalism" by Maloba (2018). Berman and Lonsdale referred to him as a "pioneer" in their analysis of his writings since he was one of the first Kikuyu to compose and publish; "his representational achievement was unique" (Berman & Lonsdale, 1998).

President Jomo Kenyatta's reputation was tainted. While he was often praised as a freedom fighter in cahoots with the Mau Mau, events after independence will prove otherwise (Murray,1974). He centralized control of the central government in the first five years of independence (Boone, 2012), suppressing the autonomy of Kenya's provinces to avoid the entrenchment of ethnic power bases (Assensoh,1998). He argued that centralized government regulation was needed to meet the rising demand for local services and to aid faster economic development. He established a commission to look at local government changes in 1966, and in 1969, it passed the Transfer of Functions Act, which ended grants to local governments and moved major services from provincial to federal control (Assensoh, 1998).

The divisions within KANU were a major focus for Kenyatta during the first three and a half years of the country's independence. Following the assassination of Pio Pinto in February 1965, opposition to Kenyatta's government rose (Murray-Brown,1974). Kenyatta condemned the assassination of the popular leftist politician, even though UK intelligence officials suspected his bodyguard was behind it (Maloba,2018). The KPU declared in its manifesto that it would follow "truly socialist policies," such as nationalizing public services and that Kenyatta's government "wanted[ed] to create a capitalist structure in the image of Western capitalism but were too ashamed or deceptive to call it that" (Ochieng,1995). The KPU was declared the official opposition by the government, restoring the country's two-party system (Gertzel,1970).

Kenyatta saw the new party as a direct challenge to his rule, and he saw it as a communist-inspired attempt to destabilize him. Soon after the KPU was formed, the Kenyan Parliament amended the constitution to ensure that defections elected on the KANU ticket could not automatically retain their seats and would have to run for re-election (Maloba,2018). The election of June 1966 was the outcome of this. The Luo grew increasingly united behind the KPU, which had been subjected to localized violence that hampered its ability to campaign, despite Kenyatta's government's official denial. Both national newspapers, as well as government-owned radio and television stations, backed KANU. Just 9 of the 29 defectors were re-elected on the KPU ticket; Odinga was one of them, with a large majority in Central Nyanza. Joseph Murumbi took over as Vice President from Odinga, who was then replaced by Moi (Cullen,2016).

Despite the post-independence hype and aspirations, Jomo Kenyatta did not shift the colonial sociopolitical and economic order. Excessive power was concentrated in Kenyatta's person, resulting in the replacement of European elites with an African elite allied to Kenyatta, primarily from his tribe. At the beginning of his rule, Kenyatta showed some commitment to the ideals of intra-party democracy and relied on KANU structures to manage internal opposition from political allies because he had not effectively socialized with members of his party (KANU) and did not adequately understand their political priorities. His time in Britain had significantly dislocated him from local political experiences (Bayart, 2009). As Hornsby (2013) observes, there were some

members of the party and even among his own Kikuyu relatives who did not favour his role as president because they claimed that he had very little contribution to the liberation process and that he even contradicted Mau Mau's use of force as a revolutionary process, while others claimed that he was poor and old, so he was not suitable to lead the country.

With these considerations, Kenyatta at the beginning of his leadership appeared open to politicians and elites in the KANU party to engage in as much discussion as possible within the party to encourage as many potential politicians as possible to stay loyal to KANU, retain the party's supremacy in the legislature, and provide for his eventual election as Prime Minister. However, in the course of his administration, Kenyatta influenced political transformation in the country for a dejure party system to reduce the power offered to regions (jimbos), which he strongly believed would struggle against his government's commitment for realization of a scheme of national identity (Ochieng'Opalo, 2019).

Branch & Cheeseman (2006) also state that this arrangement frustrated and sacrificed ideological consistency, thereby making party unity fragile. This was clearly expressed in the Party Parliamentary Group where party elites did not unite on legislative debates but expressed conflicting demands and divergent positions. Two coalitions, therefore, featured in the party. The Kiambu Kikuyu elite and Luo labour leader Tom Mboya on one side, and the nationalist Odinga-Kaggia alliance linking the squatters of Luo and Kikuyu were on the other. Kenyatta persuaded the two key coalitions to reason with each other in tactically handling internal democracy in KANU, an approach that proved fruitful since most of the major political figures in KADU entered KANU ranks within a year of the 1963 election and settled on resolving their divergent interests within a single KANU party (Branch & Cheeseman, 2006).

The merger of KANU and KADU provided a good opportunity for Kenyatta to fulfil his agenda of establishing a unitary government rather than a government split based on party platforms. Soon after the alliance, to balance divergent interests in the coalition, he adopted pragmatic policies in his administration (Maiyo, 2008). Political Parties and Intra-Party Democracy in East Africa. From Representative to Participatory Democracy. As a "moderate" and a possible bridge-builder in a forced alliance, this boosted his profile in political practice, which was ideologically unfriendly and connected to divergent and conflicting interests. He seemed not to depend on the ideology of either of the two parties and declined to declare his allegiance to any of the two political parties (Hornsby, 2013).

In the pioneering phases of his rule, Kenyatta's strategy for fostering intra-party democracy included negotiations with different groups that made up his diverse political constituency. This was aimed at the resolution of the contradictions of ideology and power within KANU and between KANU and KADU. To avoid the rise of political extremes because of the potential failure of a striking agreement between those parties, he also facilitated compromises between opposing groups in the party. He assumed that splitting KANU into different parties or reinforcing existing opposition parties would simply create a challenge to his presidency. This made him consider endorsing a one-party system rather than a multi-party rivalry (Chelanga et. al. 2009).

In verifying the approach, J.M Kariuki, in his memoirs, published in 1963, noted that...

> *Kenyatta managed to place himself above the party. He did not depend on KADU or KANU and was more than any political party. "Kenyatta believed that, since it is not always easy to strike a compromise between competing parties, the measure of a leader is not limited to the fact that he or she can be able to build successful coalitions but mainly on how he or she manages the tension between groups when it becomes impossible to forge common positions (J.M Kariuki, 1963:3).*

The preference of Kenyatta for a single party government was required by the refusal of KADU to support the government's emergency declaration in the late Northern Frontier District in late 1963. This made Kenyatta conclude that the acts of KADU demonstrated the possible danger of regionalism and immobility that could be generated in his government by a multi-party system (Khamisi, 2011). Khamisi also reinforced this stance by stating that he did not rejoice in this transition when KADU's leaders entered KANU in 1964 but categorically punished KADU as a faction consisting of self-conceived politicians synonymous with the betrayal of the path of the African nationalists. Kenyatta argued that the same individuals who collaborated with the imperialists during the fight against colonialism were KADU agents.

In other words, a one-party state with a mass base was more democratic for Kenyatta than a state with two mass-based political parties, so spokesmen from various segments of the Kenyan population needed to believe in a one-party system to increase the capacity of governments to manage consensus between opposing political groups (Widner, 1992). In these early stages of transformation, therefore, adherence to the values of an "inclusive coalition" was rather eminent. Oyugi & Odhiambo-Mbai (2003) states, however, that, during this period of transition to democracy, the party remained relatively weak because it had no clear internal structures for resolving differences between members and forging a common party position on issues due to the crisis of managing a fluid coalition and advocating a single party agenda. Muigai (2004), argues that while such debates persisted, Kenyatta pointedly ignored suggestions to improve the party by establishing a forum for deliberations or by supplying local projects and activities with funds through the party. He did not use the party as a means of ensuring the approval of citizens' policies and relied on the civil service to build his networks across the world. This made party leaders resort to building and sustaining stronger relations with their local constituents, not the party since they had to compete without financial backing from the party in periodic elections.

As the organization of the party became weaker, Kenyatta regarded the party as a weak weapon to reinforce his authority and settled on weakening it by reducing its presence in government by limiting political recruitment and consequently reducing the political space (Hornsby, 2013). This was revised, according to Anyang' Nyong'o, since, as required by the principles of parliamentary procedure, the process of competitive political recruitment was not institutionalized through elections (Nyong'o, 1993). The Kenyatta government frustrated the growth of new political talent and stimulus for political ambition in both government and party by limiting parliamentary

representation and practice during this period because parliament could not effectively regulate the growth of executive power, ensure the stability of a pluralistic political system and realize the active participation of people (Nyongo, 1993).

Kenyatta started to look at the state as his primary source of authority and his dependency on the party was diminished or ignored. As he became president, he started to see the party as a non-political and administrative entity and began to drain party funds, putting its organization and management in the hands of three main leaders, Kenyatta, Odinga, and Mboya (Arnold, 1974). He centralized power in the President's office and maintained absolute control over the party since the constitution of the party also provided that the country's president was also the ruling party's head (Hakes, 1970).

The provincial administration, not the party, then became Kenyatta's chosen vehicle for securing compliance with government policies and stances (Ajulu, 2000). By instituting the authority of the executive over the party, the functions of KANU in parliament regarding lawmaking, public debate, and political recruitment were instead affected. Consequently, KANU began to exercise little control over policy debates in government as most of the legislative initiatives originated from the Office of the President and were only presented to parliament for discussion and adoption (Ajulu, 2000).

The centralization of Kenyatta's power had wide-reaching effects on the performance of KANU as a government and political party. According to Muigai (2004), by reducing the avenues of political recruitment in KANU, Kenyatta was able to contain the leadership succession of the political elites in the party. Political recruitment was directed at fulfilling the intentions of his political survival and was not based on norms, laws, and procedures of the party. There was no clear separation of powers between the party and government-the party was government and government the party thus no need for intra-party democracy. This could be confirmed by the fact that as the Presidency in Kenya became the primary source of legitimization for proposed political policies and social values, constitutional amendments immediately followed to consolidate Kenyatta's power against parliamentary initiatives and the party (Muigai, 2004).

Effects of Constitutional Amendments on Intra-party democracy

Parliament alone carried out the changes to the Constitution, which became an important base for high-stake political games. There was no effort to participate in the making of a participatory constitution at all. It also marked the establishment of a strong centralist government through the formation of a republic and the dismantling of regionalism. The practice of regular amendments was the legal recognition of increasingly authoritarian politics and constitutional regression, the elimination of explicitly inserted constitutional clauses, and the lowering of the thresholds for the introduction of constitutional amendments to make it easier to amend the Constitution (Andreassen, 2013).

These reforms saw the consolidation of power in the Presidency and the whittling down of the Legislature's oversight position over the Executive (Bannon, 2006). It has therefore been argued that certain changes were made to the degree that these amendments were meant to resolve the

challenges of governance in the newly independent country. The political elite suggested suppressing political opposition and instilling discipline in the party and parliament. In reality, party indiscipline was viewed by the state as a constitutional problem. Other amendments were intended to strengthen and establish opportunities for future political supremacy, such as the creation of a rival party, KPU, amendments that concentrated security functions in the executive, delayed elections by two years, and encouraged the assignment of new constituencies to Senators after the abolition of the Senate (Murungi, 2013).

Sponsored by constitutional amendments, by capitalizing on the ideological split in the party overland policies, the organization of state power, and economic growth strategies to institute political purge, Kenyatta subsequently decreased competition in KANU. This saw the Kenyatta and Mboya scheme that isolated Odinga successfully as a renegade politician bent on destroying the newly won Uhuru (Bienen, 205).

Odinga's policies focused on a Marxist ideology were often demeaned as the politics of the lazy,' while Uhuru na Kazi became powerful propaganda against members of the newly formed Kenya People's Union-KPUU (Hornsby, 2012). In Kenya Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965, the government also used its policy text, Kenya African Socialism: Its Application to Planning, to disseminate both the leadership and political contradictions in KANU (Branch & Cheeseman, 2006). These steps had to be enforced by the Kenyatta government because KANU, as a party, faced growing internal disputes, especially after the merger with KADU (Maxon, 2009).

Disagreements among the political elite over the constitutional future of Kenya continued to characterize the political arena after Lancaster House, especially in terms of internal democracy in KANU (Maxon, 2009). Kenyatta, therefore, settled on negating the principles of KADU in the coalition structure to handle government tensions that could perpetuate further party and government disputes. KANU Party Vice President Jaramogi Oginga Odinga conveyed this attitude when he claimed that...

> *It was a desire to move rapidly to self-government and freedom to adopt the federal draft, but if the party won power at the ballot box, it would be able to amend the constitution to the unitary form it wanted (Oginga, 1967 pg. 122).*

Once the elections were won by KANU and Jomo Kenyatta became Prime Minister on 1 June 1963, he explicitly confirmed Odinga's position with a cabinet of 13 ministers as he outlined his expectations and agenda for his government and his potential style of political management of KANU. Thus, he is quoted as saying:

> *Independence will give us the chance to work unrestrictedly to create a democratic African Socialist Kenya. The Marxist theory of class warfare" will not apply to the situation in Kenya. It is important to update and look into the future attitudes that were acceptable when we were fighting for independence. Independent Kenya will follow a republican constitution because it is a form of government that is*

appropriate to our circumstances and meaningful to our citizens" (East Africa Standard, 19th April 1963 pg. 20).

Kenyatta demonstrated his mindset and future ambitions in the management of his government and internal democracy in KANU in this address. Arguing that opposition and political unrest would not be tolerated by his administration, he stated his intentions to be abrasive in handling KANU and government politics. From his argument, it is also clear that his party and government would not be constrained by internal opposition in action and would not accept criticism. These established the base of the presidency's frustrating internal democracy in KANU.

In addition to Kenyatta's measures, there is proof of interference with internal democracy in the KANU government by colonial authority manoeuvres. The colonial authority was committed to distinguishing "moderate" KANU leaders such as Mboya and Kenyatta from the "extreme group" headed by Odinga and Ngei, men of aggression, and communist contacts (Cooley, 2011). Thus, to maintain discord on the KANU side of the alliance, they shaped the composition of the first cabinet in Kenya. Odinga was removed from the government in Kenyatta's cabinet and did not obtain a ministry at the insistence of Maudling, partly because of his opposition to the purchase of African properties, but mainly because it was suspected that he was in touch with and earned money from communist governments (Nissimi, 2001). The British claimed both Russian and Chinese interests were represented by him. In the colonists and foreign press, this prompted the Kenyatta government to campaign against him, accusing him of attempting a revolt.

The failure of Odinga to obtain a ministry was not only a sign of failure in Kenyatta's government to institutionalize internal democracy, but more importantly, a price for Kenyatta's strength. This is because he followed the colonialists' advice to keep Odinga out of the cabinet without mentioning his KANU contributions. Equally, Kenyatta seemed to presume the choice of Odinga for his leadership as the first president of the Republic of Kenya, even against the wishes of some of his relatives (Odinga, 1967).

In the distribution of ministerial authority, ethnicity was also illustrated, since most of the ministries were dominated by the two largest ethnic groups. Six Kikuyu including Kenyatta, four Luo, and six ministers from other communities. One minister served each of the other groups. The cabinet reflected, among the Kikuyu, the Kiambu centre of Kenyatta's support, with five Kikuyu ministers from Kiambu communities, one from Kiambu (Kiano), and none at all from Nyeri (Hornsby, 2013).

Due to distinct personality competition, the complexities of internal-party democracy in KANU also became more daunting in the transition period. For instance, Mboya (secretary) led KANU, supported by Joe Murumbi (national treasurer), in preparing for the elections, but the two were not friends. Odinga, on the other hand, remained vice-president of KANU and vice-president of Kenyatta, but his socialism tinged with Luo nationalism put him on a coalition path with Kenyatta, whose nationalism was equally Kikuyu-oriented (Hornsby, 2013). According to Lynch (2006), over this time, the East-West divide that characterized politics in the KANU government could not have been as extreme as claimed. What happened was ego competition over the power balance.

Kenyatta's deep suspicions over Mboya and Odinga could explain this. Kenyatta was wary of Odinga over his communist stance but was increasingly worried about the popularity of Mboya at the same time. He, therefore, had to find ways of accommodating both of them.

According to Hornsby (2013), while Kenyatta labelled Odinga a Communist, both of them ran a secret joint bank account with communist funds that were used by KANU radicals such as Pio Gama Pinto, Murumbi, and Kaggia to verify Mboya's dominance in the party, may confirm Lynch's claim. In an abortive coup against Mboya in the Kenya Federation of Labor in October 1962, Kenyatta explicitly stated his dissatisfaction with Mboya when he endorsed Kubai. Hornby (2013), explains that due to this move, Mboya threatened to remove the Luo and Labor movement from KANU.

The Luo wing of KANU also had suspicion and mistrust between Odinga and Mboya, while factional political conflicts ensued among the Kikuyu, particularly between Kiano and those who supported Kenyatta's 'forgive and forget strategy' and between Kenyatta and Kaggia. Kaggia was openly unhappy with the land and settlement policies of the government and was also critical of the independent land deal and the use of the willing buyer, willing seller agreements to pass land to Africans (Ogendo, 1971). Kaggia's failure to offer a guarantee of future obedience called for Kenyatta to sack him on 15 June 1964. However, the pro-and anti-Kaggia axis persisted, as two opposing sets of party officials were brought up in KANU. This prompted Kenyatta to visit Kiambu to condemn Kaggia's growth failures in Kandara and followed later with calls for his resignation (Ogendo, 1971).

KANU also had to deal with politicians who were committed to preserving nationalist credentials against the wishes of their ethnic groups or regions (Haugerud, 1997). In November 1962, because of such intrigues, Ngei left KANU motivated primarily by personal reasons to form an ethnic-based faction, the African Peoples Party (APP), because permission to attend the Lancaster House Conference had been denied. Tensions related to ethnicity were also observed on the KADU wing of the coalition, the Luhyia's loyalty to the party proved uncertain due to the potential of land disputes with the Kalenjin, but Muliro's antipathy to Mboya in KANU retained most of the Luhyia in KANU (Haugerud, 1997).

Therefore, the May 1963 elections saw an effort by KANU to reduce the dominance of the powerful tribes in the politics and government of the party. In these elections, KANU put up candidates who in minority areas, were not members of the dominant group. While in Nakuru District, where seats were dominated by the Kalenjin and Kikuyu, Luo or Luhyia candidates were favoured, John Keen stood in the Luhyia-dominated Trans-Nzoia. Just three Kikuyu candidates ran for seats in Nairobi, compared to 22 from other groups (Kyle, 1999). The 1963 elections, however, saw the continuation of factional contests within KANU, between supporters of Mboya and Odinga in Nyanza, Nakuru, and Nairobi, and between Home Guards and 'freedom fighters' in the Central Region, despite this attempt by KANU to demystify the presence of dominant tribes in the party. There were also been unsuccessful attempts to avoid the election of extremists like Kaggia as candidates for KANU. Therefore, deep intra-party disputes over elections were observed in KANU (Kyle, 1999).

Campaigns were marked by widespread intimidation and many deaths coupled with bribery in the 1963 elections. The campaigns were often, crudely ethnic. In Mombasa where a KADU candidate repeatedly claimed that unless they supported KADU, all Kikuyu and Luo civil servants and hawkers would be repatriated up-country (Anderson, 2005). Elements of corruption, especially within KANU, were also observed. At the local level, KANU sent Central Area voters to register and vote in the Rift valley because it had relatively few voters in Nakuru, Kitale, Eldoret, and Kericho. Therefore, the popularity of the party in the rift valley region was largely dependent on the availability of voters from outside the area. Most of the candidates in the elections were mainly young male leaders, so it turned out that women were not adequately represented at this stage, so the political elite that led Kenya to independence was entirely dominated by young men because of the violent and radical processes of transition did not favour women's participation. While women's contributions were meaningful, they were ignored by the party hence women did not find any representation in the groundbreaking government system (Anderson, 2005).

However, Hornsby (2013) suggests that the gender factor was replaced as the sole criterion of candidate selection by ethnicity, which was politically crucial at this time. Soon after independence, the political leaders who established the first government lacked stable financial capital and were inexperienced in both governance and parliamentary politics. They were mostly relatively radical. Ex-detainees or forest warriors were the bulk of parliamentary representatives from the central province. Therefore, party leadership, according to Arnold (1974), had difficulties in pursuing a constitutional and democratic approach to reform in both the party and government because the radical history of most party elites in KANU was a major challenge to internal democracy. This may be due to the reality that the desire for freedom determined their immediate strategy for them to reward their struggle with authority and wealth.

Cold War and Politics of Intra-Party Democracy in KANU

Kenyatta had very close ties with the British, with tens of thousands of British people residing in Kenya, and hundreds of important administrative and technical posts in Kenya were still staffed by the British. In 1964, in the event of a left-wing coup, the British pledged assistance to Kenyatta and offered military assistance against Somalia (Mueller, 1972). In exchange, Kenyatta provided a strong, Western-oriented government that would safeguard the interests of the British on land and jobs, and promoted a moderate line between the OAU and the UN, at a period when both the communist threat and anti-colonial pressure troubled Western governments. However, in other branches of government and KANU, close economic, political, and military ties between Kenya and Britain were a source of profound dissatisfaction. Many saw it as proof of the neo-colonial partnership that would jeopardize Kenya's self-reliance (Hornsby, 2013).

Equally warm were relations with the US. Education was the main assistance that Kenya got from the US. In 1964, more than one thousand Kenyan students in the US benefited from the student program. But the primary goal of the US was to keep it from falling under communist rule in sub-Saharan Africa. While he denied being a communist, Odinga was largely allied with the Eastern bloc but was treated with scepticism by Kenyatta, Mboya, Njonjo, and others (Goldsworthy, 1982). In 1964, in Moscow, Odinga signed an economic agreement providing financing for nine projects,

including a hospital in Kisumu, agricultural improvements, a technical college, and a radio station. There are also claims that a secret meeting between Odinga, Murumbi, and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai was arranged by the radical Pio da Gama Pinto and addressed the possibility of a socialist or communist revolution in Kenya (Mueller, 1972).

Wanyande & Odhiambo-Mbai (2003) claims that the chances of a sufficient left turn were not good, and Odinga's ideas were seen by Kenyatta and Mboya as threatening not only the economy of Kenya but also his survival. The British were delivering economically and militarily and firmly supported Kenyatta., according to Goldsworthy. In the KANU government, the conflict between Odinga and Kenyatta and between communism and capitalism also overlapped with various conflicts over leadership within the Luo and Kikuyu. While Odinga portrayed a nationalist rural Luo identity, Mboya reflected a cosmopolitan, worker-oriented figure that was more de-ethnicized. Odinga never acknowledged that he could be led by Mboya, 15 years his junior, underestimating his determination to succeed Kenyatta (Goldsworthy, 1982).

Kaggia was a threat to Kenyatta's pre-eminence among the Kikuyu, in the same way. In both their levels of elite support and their attributes, there was an imbalance between the two forces. The pro-Western leaders had greater organizational abilities which gave an advantage to the pro-Eastern leaders. They were, however, confronted by the fact that the African majority believed in the socialist message that promoted land redistribution. Kaggia was particularly critical of the independence land deal and the 'willing buyer willing seller' agreements to move large farms into African hands and preferred instead to confiscate white farms and use them to settle landless Africans on cooperative farms (Hornsby, 2013).

According to Ogot (1972), the socialists wanted to nationalize foreign-owned companies, seize white settler farms without compensation, and pursue a more pro-Eastern foreign policy. They hoped that the party distributed the fruits of freedom equitably. This realization was dedicated to Oginga Odinga and Bildad Kaggia, who embodied the party's radicals, while Jomo Kenyatta and Tom Mboya, who led the 'moderates' or 'conservative' camp, were slow or uncommitted to this expectation (Arnold, 1974). Consequently, based on assumptions, this marked an internal split in the party. Moves towards party unity were also hindered by deepening differences of opinion between party elites on economic policy, relations with Britain and the US, the land settlement program, and the government's responsibilities to the poor and landless, particularly those who suffered during Mau Mau (Githigaro, 2019).

Consequently, in the party, two ideological differences developed between those who favoured British/American and Chinese/Russian policies. The division between capitalism and socialism continued to divide KANU with conservatists like Moi, who constantly believed that communist funds were available to the leftists, a conviction held by Kenyan, British and American intelligence. Oginga Odinga was not alone, John Keen and Ngei were accused equally of being openly communist." More allegations were made that Keen particularly sponsored military training for students in Eastern Europe and Russia, while Odinga and Ngei hosted a Russian socialist at a public rally in Machakos in September 1964, confirming their alliance with socialist interests (Githigaro, 2019). Pio DA Gama Pinto, a journalist and trade unionist, also enjoyed

relations with China and the Soviet Union, according to Purcell (1969), so they were closely monitored along with Odinga by British intelligence on charges of organizing military training for youth in communist countries.

The United States offered financial, intelligence, and organizational support to the Kenyatta government to fight Eastern influence. The Lumumba College, set up in 1964 to train KANU officials, had to be closed because it was deemed to have secret aims to inculcate African socialist and communist ideals. There were claims that the institute was being used by Chinese and South African communists as a training ground for leftists to take over KANU. The US warned Kenyatta of the Institute's risks (Hornsby, 2012).

In February-April 1965, a potential military threat to Kenyatta's government was deterred, confirming Kenya's commitment to a pro-Western alliance. Soon after Mboya and Kibaki tabled a policy paper that became Sessional Paper No 10 of 1965, describing Kenya's, commitment to a mixed capitalist system, the pro-Eastern group instructed Pio da Gama Pinto to prepare a competing paper to be presented at the same time and scheduled a no trust' vote in the government (Branch, 2014). In February 1965, Pinto was killed by special officers loyal to Kenyatta outside his home in Nairobi, which could be supported by the fact that Wanyoike Thungu, Kenyatta's bodyguard, had warned Pinto that if he did not flee the country, he would be killed. With the assassination of Pinto, factionalism in KANU strengthened in party organization and parliament.

Kenyatta transferred Odinga from home affairs to the new position of vice-president, following this ideological inconsistency. It was, however, an appointment, not an electoral role, with few formal duties, according to Njonjo's and Mboya's amendments. Odinga was bitter about the removal of his duties and later described his position as a naked cock' with nothing to do (Oruka, 1992). Kenyatta's distrust of Odinga grew greater, taking ex-KADU Chairman Moi into the cabinet to succeed Odinga as Minister of Home Affairs. Moi was less confrontational than both KADU's Muliro and Ngala but was pro-Western and conservative. Paul Ngei was also brought into the cabinet to test Odinga's radicals along with Moi (Hornsby, 2013).

Kenyatta went on to create a power structure organized around himself, his ethnic community and interests, and a broad coalition of others whose interests he supported. He focused his energies on the exercise of authority and his style of leadership was no longer that of a people's man - he was a man apart, to whom bodyguards and supporters carefully controlled access. By using his power to make grants of unalienated government land, he chose to grow his fortune (Barkan & Okumu, 1978).

Kenyatta promoted the development of a neo-patrimonial regime rather than a party state, with increasing plunder of state resources and resistance to such initiatives within the KANU government, partly because he could not manage KANU reliably. The overlap between the top party and state leaders in positions made them have little time for party activities and blurred the boundaries between functions of the state and the party. The party became more radically radical and the pro-Odinga faction was more focused on keeping the party alive and conducting party elections (Barkan & Okumu, 1978).

The significance of the Assembly declined and apart from being a centre of debates never exercised its power to hold government accountable and never forced significant changes to the legislative program or policies of the government. The assembly, like the party, became more radical for most problems, and attempts were made to avoid the passage of bills for private members and resolutions for private members (Hornsby, 2012). The state inhibited access to citizens by politicians through public gatherings by denying licenses for security purposes, so the provincial government and the state could monitor how politicians approached the electorate and could muffle more radical messages. Mboya later arranged the burning of copies of newspapers considered hostile by KANU, while Achieng Oneko declared that any effort by the press to encourage disunity would not be tolerated by the Prime Minister or other government members (Barkan & Okumu, 1978).

In the party, constant disagreements and radicalism made Kenyatta focus on pursuing his politics instead of the party through the provincial administration. As the independent state began to echo its colonial parents' oppressive attitudes to the opposition, the ladder that African elites had used to rise to power was then kicked away and replaced with the provincial administration in charge. While the party lost its importance, the cabinet's power also diminished and government decisions were taken by caucuses of ministers close to Kenyatta because leaders of the national party abandoned or ignored their state positions (Ogendo, 1971). KANU then started to facilitate the form of rule of the patron-client system, while Kenyatta and Mboya stopped mobilizing the population through the local party apparatus because of the perception that a more activist populist and socialist faction controlled it (Ogendo, 1971).

In parliament, the attitude of Kenyatta to any criticism within the party became increasingly undemocratic. He warned that negative and disruptive opposition was major damage to democracy and would easily lead to the destruction of the rights and privileges of those who oppose him in government and the party (Kenyatta, 1964). KANU did not recognize the validity of free political discussion, and in 1964 it outlawed public meetings in many districts, which later became provincial, after the army mutiny. When the ban was lifted later in June, Mboya cautioned that meetings should not be used to 'undermine existing control' or to attack the party and government destructively (Mboya, 1964).

Therefore, the era from independence to 1965 was marked by disputes over KANU's process of transfer of power. Instead of organizing its government management house, KANU was threatened by the dispute between the two camps over the centralized government's power. The decisions that then arose from the leadership of the party were based on short-term interests and were determined by simple choices of direction (Bennett, 1966). The party leadership took the model of dictatorship in the same way as what transpired in the colonial period because when Kenya became a republic in December 1964.

Kenya became a republic in December 1964 and Kenyatta became, the president, head of the armed forces, and a symbol of national pride. He became above the party and the disputes of small parties and used his position in the republic to make a significant reorganization of the party and government and to cut the influence of some of his rivals (Hornsby, 2013).

The national officials of KANU disregarded the constitution of the party and avoided any attempt to hold elections. National Secretary John Keen and Assistant Executive Officer John O'Washika wrote to Kenyatta in 1964 describing the party's decline and calling for a governing council meeting, but little was done (Hornsby, 2013). Instead in the branches inspired by the central leadership, many coups took place to ensure that the members of the party would be more pliable if they were to meet to call for elections. This was later followed by the KANU branch elections to appoint new officials in progressive areas such as Kiambu, Kitui, South Nyanza, Mombasa, Machakos, Nakuru, and Kisii districts between 1964 and Dec 1965.

These coups were aided by the use of police assistance to apprehend undesirable opponents if necessary (Gertzel, 1970). These coup elections resulted in the removal in May of Kaggia in Kiambu. In August 1965, Achieng Oneko was expelled from the Nakuru branch, while radical supporters of MP Zephania Anyiene were ousted by a coup orchestrated by ministers from Gusii. Consequently, the losers accused Mboya and Njonjo of rigging polls and two rival party branches appeared in several districts of Kenya (Goldsworthy, 1982).

In July 1965, in defiance of these schemes, the radicals attempted a party coup, with 27 of them taking over the headquarters of KANU and calling for the replacement of national party leaders. Their party elections were also called, removing all KANU officials except Kenyatta and Odinga. Later, twenty-four of them were convicted and imprisoned for eighteen months and the state of the party became more appalling, prompting John Keen to draft another letter to Kenyatta complaining about the failure to convene the Annual Members' Conference since 1962 and the party's poor financial situation because the workers had not been paid (Hornsby, 2013).

The overlap in positions between the top party and state leaders was one of the contributing factors to the decline of the party in political practice, so state leaders had little time for party activities. The party was also, essentially, more radical than the government. But as those challenges persisted, the pro-Odinga team was keen to keep the party going and called for party elections that Mboya did not heed (Goldsworthy, 1982). Therefore, because of personality rivalries, ethnicity, and access to resources, and affiliation with national-level coalitions, factionalism dominated the local party branches and sub-branches (Mueller, 1972).

More ideological cleavages featured within the leadership of the party and government, over discussions on African Socialism in parliament. Therefore, Sessional Paper No.10 of 1965 was hurriedly published to provide a simple response to the public clamour for an ideology of government (East Africa Standard, April 1963). Critics of this paper argued that it was neither an economic agenda nor a political theory. KANU did not command adequate power in its defence, even as the controversy raged over this doctrine, confirming that the efficacy of the central organs of the party had deteriorated rapidly (Hornsby, 2012). Besides, the emerging presidential charisma that forced the president to work outside the party and not relies on it for his political survival also led to the decline in party unity (Okoth Ogendo, 1971).

In the party, the struggle for state power escalated as the centrifugal forces of nationalism jostled for a share of the fruits of independence with some pushing for an ambitious program of

distribution of settler lands to the landless, nationalization of the key means of production, especially foreign-owned businesses, provision of free social services like education (Zeleza, 2008). But the Conservatives, around President Kenyatta, considered all of these unacceptable, so KANU's unity began to waver in priority over these disagreements.

Parliament members lost real interest in defending the party in parliament unless their interests were affected (Hornsby, 2012). Most of them were more prepared to disobey the party whip, resulting in the loss of party seats to independent candidates (Odinga, 1967). Party divisions also grew restless and requested reorganization, while the electorate expressed their disappointment with the party in the 1965 Senate elections by choosing independent candidates over party nominees. Also openly discussed was the potential creation of opposition parties (East African. Standard, 22 June, 8 July 1965, and 4 January, 22, 25 February, 2 March 1966 for the Daily Nation). This made Kenyatta declare the KANU backbenchers party dissolved in June 1965 and replaced it with a larger Parliamentary Group on charges of interfering with government policy in parliament. Kenyatta also resorted to the reorganization of the party, which was ultimately concluded at the 1966 Limuru congress, which also saw the exclusion of party extremists.

The Limuru Members' Conference and the Reorganization of KANU (1966)

As Secretary-General of KANU, Tom Mboya suggested that party reorganization proposals were to be approved by a Limuru Convention that later took place in March 1966. The meeting, however, was not only intended to oversee KANU's re-organization, but also to compel the party to be obedient. Kenyatta used the conference to suggest that the adoption of a new constitution for the party would include his proposals for reorganization. In his ideas, however, the overarching issue was the need to ensure that internal party discussions did not interfere with the functioning of the provincial government, which had become his key tool for enforcing party policies and preserving its relations with the grassroots (Widner, 1992).

His key policy was to isolate the party from government instruments, so his point of view on party organization was that the roles of the party and the executive should be kept separate so the government's reputation could be badly harmed (Kenyatta, 1966). He was highly concerned that the separation of interests between politics and professionalism could cause problems with the effectiveness of the party and the public service, so he wanted to distinguish the two roles to include government and party divisions (Kenyatta, 1966).

A key concern of the conference was also the need to preserve an inclusive one-party system, but it was evident from Kenyatta's speech at the Limuru conference that he did not prefer a reinforced single-party system in which party officials assumed the tasks of the executive (Kenyatta, 1966). He was similarly critical of politicians' attempts to use the dominant political party as a tool for their collection of policies to gain support. He then claimed that his government did not wish to send legislation to Parliament to make Kenya a one-party state and went on to alert fellow politicians against suppressing opposition within KANU because he believed in pluralism within the party (Kenyatta, 1965).

The leadership of the conservative wing - "KANU A being very powerful did not share Kenyatta's confidence in pluralism within KANU ranks. They also questioned his dedication to allowing continuous negotiation between groups in the party as a tactic to maintain order in the party. The concerns of Kenyatta about the dominance of conservatives in KANU made him decide on reducing their party powers because the conservatives were well represented in party machinery and had comparatively greater resources to affect patronage (Widner, 1992).

Many of the conservatives closest to Kenyatta came from outside Nairobi: Kiambu, Kiambaa, Gatundu, and Limuru, and had more access to the president, while Nyeri and Murang'a politicians were under-represented in parliament, and some of these MPs formed their faction within Parliament through the leadership of Charles Rubia, a Nairobi MP, and others (Gertzel, 1970).

Against the backdrop of these concerns, which presumably called for reorganization plans in the party, the need to control Odinga's dominance in the party was the key motive for reorganization and the Limuru conference (Hornsby, 2012). His powers as Vice-President were decreased and His office was only in charge of 'National Assembly matters, Africanization and preparation, and public holidays' in 1966 (E. Af, Standard, 11 July, 28th August 1964). Mboya and Odinga clashed violently during the Limuru conference debate, forcing Odinga to leave the Assembly (East African, 17 February 1966), but what might and should have been a proper party reorganization agenda turned out to be a program to get rid of Odinga and his supporters. This is because the implementation of an item in the party constitution that suggested the abolition of the position of Vice-President then held by Odinga and the establishment of seven Provincial Vice-Presidencies was the main development that could be related to the conference.

On 14 April 1966, Odinga resigned as vice-president and formed a new party, the Kenya People's Union (KPU), bringing 28 MPs and a wide section of the trade union movement with him. As a renegade politician who was bent on undermining the newly gained independence, Kenyatta and Mboya effectively alienated Odinga and degraded his policies as the politics of the lazy' based on a Marxist philosophy (Ogendo, 1971). However, Odinga accused the government of KANU of being run by underground masters who serve foreign interests. The KPU voted in the May 1966 "Little General Election" but was trounced with only nine of its 29 parliamentary members managing to hold their seats. The government used the state equipment to intimidate the leaders of the KPU, who were often depicted as unpatriotic, subversive, and ethnic (Barkan, 1978). As seven of the nine MPs in the party were Luo, the KPU failed to attract a national appeal. Odinga and all the KPU leaders were arrested two months later, and the KPU was outlawed three days later at the end of October (Barkan, 1978).

Constitutional Reforms and the Management of Disunity in KANU Party

Immediately, constitutional amendments were chosen to save KANU from ongoing problems linked to its failure in its operations to maintain internal democracy. Constitutionalism was not respected, according to Yash Pal Ghai, and the Constitution was not regarded as an essential document that created either a compact or established the basic government charter, but quickly became an instrument of power and oppression (2002:34). Changes in the constitution were

therefore aimed at protecting the governing party's electoral benefits or coping with political dissidents. When it fits the ruling party's political interests, changes were retrospective. The first amendment adopted for this reason was the fourth constitutional amendment that provided that... A member who refused to attend eight consecutive sessions of the National Assembly without the Speaker's permission or was sentenced to a term of imprisonment exceeding six months will forfeit his seat in parliament (Act No 17 of the National Assembly, 1966).

This amendment's real purpose seems not to have been so committed to defending and preserving party unity against the emerging challenge of opposition parties, but primarily to enhance the President's personal power over the party and government (Ogendo, 1971). However, indiscipline among members of parliament persisted, irrespective of the consequences of the fourth constitutional amendment. A fifth, as read along with the eighth amendment, was passed to prevent further defections, requiring that...

> "An MP who has stood with the support of or as a supporter of a political party at his election either I resign from that party at a time when that party is a parliamentary party or (ii) has resigned from that other party at a time when that other party is a parliamentary party after the dissolution of that party is a member of another parliamentary party (Acts No. 17 of 1966 and No. 4 of 1967).

This resolution had immediate consequences because thirteen of the 29 resigned MPs rejoined KANU and were invited back by the President, although it later turned out that this did not shield them from the wrath of the Kenyatta law that was officially committed to preventing the public from misleading certain politicians. The President prorogued parliament three days after the passage of the Fifth Amendment, and the dissidents lost their seats following the Little General Election' which immediately followed in May 1969 in which KANU won more seats than KPU (Bennett, 1966). For the intention of soothing internal unrest in KANU and upholding party democracy, Kenyatta called these primary elections.

The president realized that if he did not allow the discontented members to vent their frustration, they would inevitably turn on him, bringing electoral competition within the party's confines (Bennett, 1966). KANU returned to local factionalism after the KPU had been expelled and there was no major revitalization since the party was occupied with the anti-KPU movement. The National Governing Council had not met and no further party elections had taken place (winter, 1970). KANU resorted to the use of draconian policies involving the expulsion of KPU members from some councils to protect its position against KPU, while KANU youth wingers were used in some areas to demolish KPU offices (Mueller, 1972).

The Voice of Kenya (VoK Radio station) became KANU's voice, depicting KPU as the instrument of foreign forces. Mboya and Njonjo ensured that KPU candidates were disqualified for inappropriate completion of their nomination papers in local government elections in 1968, and almost all KANU candidates went unopposed (Mueller, 1972). Due to Kenyatta's age and infirmity, there was a steady rise in internal tensions in KANU between 1968-69. To strengthen

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the central influence over political life, the tenth amendment was adopted. It suggested *that a presidential election must be held within 90 days in the event of the death of the president, resignation, or incapacity, but the vice president will succeed in his office in the meantime but with limited powers. Consequently, the right to name a president was stripped from parliament (Ogendo, 1971).*

This plan, with Odinga neutralized, targeted Mboya because he had a lot of support in parliament at this time. In KANU, this created more factionalism between Mboya and the Gatundu axis that fought for KANU's influence. Because of his limited capacity for independent action due to his modest intellectual ability and his comparatively uninfluential ethnic following, KANU 'A' or the Gatundu party-endorsed Moi for succession (Norris, 1969). Together with the Gatundu team, Moi decided to remove Mboya from the position of party secretary and frustrate his ties with Americans and Germans (confidential Africa, No 4 (1968). Following these divisions, Tom Mboya was murdered in Nairobi on 5 July 1969 by a gunman alone, creating space for the entrenchment of Kikuyu influence in KANU and the government (Goldsworthy, 1982).

Factionalism and Patron Client System of Parliamentary Politics in Kenya (1969-1974)

The political class in KANU was split by the death of Mboya. The state started to stagnate when KANU, the governing party, was left to rot because the party's policy reforms were marginal. The administration of the state and the party was then taken over by the Kikuyu elite. This is because Kikuyu technocrats and the political elite were primarily the state administrators and KANU (Kariuki, Daily Nation 11/12/1969 p.1). The composition of the cabinet formed in 1969, which was essentially the cabinet of an ethnic baron dominated by the powerful Kikuyu elite, was also affected by this arrangement (Purcell, 1969).

Besides, KANU was not released from internal divisions as it soon became clear that this coalition was split by disagreements over succession and the party simply turned into a party embroiled in constant demonstrations, much more extreme than it had been since then. These political disparities between the elites and the masses persisted from this moment on through the history of Kenya's independence (Hornsby, 2012). With the support of ethnic leaders, the Kikuyu power continued to be consolidated in KANU and the government to gain ethnic and regional support for the government. Via personal and community benefits, their support was maintained. This process institutionalized a structure in KANU in which Kenyatta and the machinery of the central government became the arbiters of the progress of any politician (Barkan & Okumu, 1978).

Over this time, because of no electoral challenge to his rule, Kenyatta remained unopposed in his leadership of KANU. This prompted him to respond ruthlessly to those he believed would threaten Kenya's development under his tutelage and set up an oppressive single-party state with political activities shifting to the local arena where local elites battled for local legitimacy in terms of their ability to pull ethnic groups into the patronage system (Barkan & Okumu, 1978). KANU then became an oligarchical party where political rivalry no longer centred on what distinguishes party policies and structures, but on who should benefit from the party's unchallengeable policies (Bienen, 1974). Kenya then became a non-party state in perpetuating a patron-client system and

the National Assembly ceased to be a genuinely legislative institution but remained a representative one with minimal or no debate as a priority on legislation (Bienen, 1974).

Furthermore, KANU lapsed into disarray as it remained legally an illegal entity over the decade, having refused to hold national elections under its constitution, the Members' Conference since 1966, and since 1969, Secretary-General, Governing Council, and National Executive Council had not been elected (Hornsby, 2012). But as KANU deteriorated in results, at least in principle, the party status still maintained Kenyatta's right to rule. It was also deemed illegal to point out the appalling state of the party as this would be considered a threat to the legitimacy of Kenyatta (Biennen, 1974).

However, some party members expressed disappointment with the management of the party. During a parliamentary debate on 9 October 1975, Shikuku commented that anyone who wants to reduce the prestige of parliament tries to kill Parliament the way KANU was killed' (Widner, 1992). When Shikuku was questioned to confirm that KANU was dead, the ruling of Seroney as deputy speaker was that there was no need to substantiate what is evident (Weekly Review, 20th October 1975, p.4). Unfortunately, on 15 October, Moi led a parliamentary walkout from the front bench, singing the song 'KANU Builds the Country' and the police entered Parliament in 1975, detained and then arrested Seroney and Shikuku in blatant violation of the immunity of participants from prosecution for their assembly speeches.

The two MPs lost their seats in parliament and remained in confinement until the death of Kenyatta (Hornsby, 2012). This was subsequently followed in August 1975 by the arrest of Koigi Wamwere-Kikuyu North aspirant to parliament because of his public criticism of Kenyatta, his communist sympathies, and his opposition to the Ngwataniro land-buying company and the Kiambu clique in Nakuru (Wamwere, 1988). Anyona was later arrested on 4th May 1977) and Ngugi Wathiongo on 31st December 1977. Anyona submitted a parliamentary document indicating that Omolo Okero, Njonjo, and Bruce Mackenzie had worked with the British High Commissioner to get the tender awarded to a Canadian company for the procurement of spare parts for railway locomotives, while Ngugu Wathiongo was accused of attempting to stage an anti-capitalist and pro-Mau Mau play in Gikuyuu (Africa Confidential, 1975).

Paradoxically, this development was characterized by the UK press representing the British government as a crafty move that skillfully broke the back of Kenyatta's opponents (Sunday Times, 19th October 1975). This possibly encouraged Kenyatta to invite MPs to a private meeting of the KANU Parliamentary Group and warned dissidents that they would have to comply or crush them from now on. "People seem to have forgotten that the hawk is in the sky and ready to swoop on the chicken," he said in his words (Africa Confidential & 1975 Guardian). KANU continued to decline in response to these challenges, creating space for the emergence of ethnic political associations. A Gikuyu, Embu, Meru Association (GEMA) emerged in 1971 (Daily Nation, 16 September 1974) and openly endorsed a succession of Kikuyu to Kenyatta, suggesting that all KANU seats be challenged except that of the president.

GEMA publicly supported and lobbied for its favoured candidates in the central province, the Kikuyu Rift and Nairobi and in particular, for a clean sweep of Nairobi's Kikuyu seats (Daily Nation, 6th September 1974). Furthermore, GEMA suggested that Moi should be opposed in as much as part of the Kikuyu in KANU preferred Moi as Kenyatta's successor. On the other side, the Luo faced a reconciliation between Odinga and Kenyatta through their union (Luo Union), hoping to gain an opportunity in the succession process. Nearly half a million Luo joined the party in 1978 and Kenyatta's loyalty delegation was formed in Nakuru, but Nyanza PC Isaiah Cheluget and loyalist Luo and Gusii leaders reversed their goal (Biennen, 1974).

Moi's appointment as Kenyatta's successor did not suit the GEMA and KANU representatives who proposed a constitutional amendment to bar the vice-president from immediately succeeding Kenyatta. The popular Change-the-Constitution movement, led by Kihika Kimani and sponsored by Dr Njoroge Mungai, Njenga Karume, James Gichuru, Jackson Angaine, and Paul Ngei, started in September 1976. As Kihika Kimani would have argued:

> Instead of the vice-president acting as President, the functions of the President should be discharged by the Speaker of the National Assembly, who would also take the responsibility of organizing for Presidential elections. Kenya should not be different from other countries where the speaker of the Assembly normally assumes the Presidency temporarily until elections are held" (Karimi & Ochieng, 1980:20).

The movement by Change-the-Constitution advocates was initiated on 26 September 1976 at a political rally in Nakuru attended by more than 20 MPs, including Kenyatta's apparent successor, Dr Njoroge Mungai (Karimi and Ochieng, 1980). However, as the constitutional debate on succession escalated, the fiery member of Mombasa Central Shariff Nassir, on October 4, 1976, became the first to publicly condemn the Change-the-Constitution advocates. Two days later, Charles M. Njonjo, the Attorney General, launched an assault on the "Kimani Group", claiming that:

> Given the recent wave of speeches at public meetings regarding the supposed need to amend our constitution, I would like to bring to the attention of the few who are being used to promote the amendment that it is a criminal offence for any person to encompass, envision, devise or plan the President's death or deposition... Moreover, by publishing them in print or writing, it is also an offence to express, utter, or announce certain imaginations, devices, or intentions (Mwaura, 1997: 15), also quoted in (Karim and Ochieng, 1980:22).

Njonjo was not taken seriously by the Change-the-Constitution advocates and on October 7th after a meeting between Kihika Kimani, Njenga Karume, Njoroge Mungai, Jackson Angaine, James Gichuru, and Paul Ngei, the Midlands Hotel Declaration was issued in 1976 (Hornsbey, 2012). They read the press release refuting the effects of Njonjo's statement and promised to democratically see the amendment as it enjoyed public support (Mwaura, 1997). A statement

condemning the amendment as "unethical, immoral, bordering on crime and very un-African" was released in Nairobi by 98 members of Parliament, led by the late Stanley Oloitiptip, Minister of Natural Resources. Dr Gikonyo Kiano, Charles Rubia, and Mwai Kibaki were notable among the 98 MPs (Hornsbey, 2012).

The division between the pro and anti-constitutional amendment parties escalated and became disgusting. The cabinet met with President Kenyatta in Nakuru and repeated Njonjo's declaration that it was unconstitutional to speak about the President's death. Under the principle of mutual accountability, the cabinet declaration then became binding and the Change-the-Constitution proponents lost the fight (Mwaura, 1998). But the support of Kenyatta for the Attorney General's statement led the advocates to concentrate on KANU and the upcoming Party conference, as in the absence of a presidential nominee, only KANU could nominate the presidential candidate.

Surprisingly, Kenyatta called the conference off and the government started to crack down on the proponents of the pro-constitutional amendment. When Kenyatta died in Mombasa on August 22, 1978, the Cabinet's emergency meeting was called, and President Daniel T. In the afternoon, Arap Moi was sworn in by Chief Justice Sir James Wicks and the anti-amendment lobby or alliance Moi-Njonjo-Kibaki carried the day (Mwaura, 1998).

From the controversy over succession, multiple variables emerge. For two reasons, this dispute never became violent and was contained. Firstly, in Parliament, the proposal was not adopted because its supporters were not sure that it would be approved by parliament. Second, and most significant, perhaps, was the position of Kenyatta. The head of state had access to all supporters for and against the constitutional amendment, and both felt he was on their side, which helped to a large degree to contain the dispute (Mwaura, 1998). The conflict often lacked a structural foundation and was a conflict between individual groups, not organizations, in the final analysis, and this included its emphasis and direction (Mwaura, 1998). The dispute was extremely narrow, although pitting two parties, as the pro-amendment-Kihika Kimani party, which was facing a Kikuyu to succeed Kenyatta, was supported primarily by GEMA members. Consequently, the party lacked mainstream support for its proposals, so the dispute did not spread to Kenyan communities and other institutions (Mati, 2020).

DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Discussions of the major findings

According to this analysis, KANU used a democratic centralism model that relied on the authority of a small elite within the party, often characterized by royalty and wealth. This result is consistent with Salim's (2007) observations that, in Kenya, party oligarchs have traditionally controlled decision-making processes in virtually all parties due to their experience, influence, and proximity to the levers of power.

The study also found that, despite Kenya's return to multiparty democracy in 1991, KANU did not completely open the door to competitive democracy. Okuku (2002) reaffirms that the democratic process has been frustrated and that policies that spring spontaneously from the wishes

of party representatives of the masses claims of adherence to Competitive, Participatory, and Deliberative democracy have failed to emerge. As a result, the demand for deliberative, competitive, and participatory democracies was only relevant in terms of opposition political parties' rigidity.

Insular management and communication systems, a lack of leadership reform, weak or dysfunctional institutions, and excluded party members are some of the factors that have been described as threatening intra-party democracy in KANU. According to Horwitz (2001), the absence of such influences has resulted in circumstances in which a few individuals have often controlled party relations without regard for the concept of inclusiveness, limiting the ability of party representatives to shape party policies (Anderson, 2005).

This study finds critical flaws in KANU's nomination of parliamentary candidates, including clear tendencies toward centralized candidate selection, imposition of controversial candidates, and manipulation of rules of procedure (Hazan & Rahat, 2010). This situation is exacerbated by the fact that the party law contains no explicit internal or external rules governing the selection of party candidates. In terms of conflict resolution procedures, it is noteworthy that conflict resolution committees do not always follow the defined legislative procedures and/or apply the rules selectively (Mac Giollabhui, 2018).

Conclusions

It has been shown in this paper that the foundation of intra-party conflicts in Kenya was laid by the ethnic orientation of political parties that first appeared in Kenya and strengthened by colonial schemes that established and restricted political thinking through the development of local indigenous councils and the Legislative Council. The Kenyatta regime, informed by these developments, became authoritarian characterized by a single-party state that was only able to function because the mechanisms of the state were brutal and oppressive. The system of politics was governed by political patronage and strategic ethnic leaders and government machinery replaced the importance of political parties. There was no sufficient emphasis on the growth of political party institutional structures as well as adherence to intra-party democracy. As a watchdog of the state, the party was absorbed by the state and lost its freedom.

Recommendations

The importance of various democratic models relevant to party management should be assessed, according to this report. Alternative practices that allow for deliberation and regulation of unhealthy competition and power monopolization by a small group of leaders (oligarchs) should be avoided, whereas democratic values that promote dependence on policies that emerge spontaneously from the interests of the masses should be favoured. Political parties should be externally regulated to avoid being instruments of the current type of tyranny, which is characterized by leadership that represents a different body of law from the citizens. Institutional changes should be implemented to identify and harmonize the policies of different political parties in Kenya and include them in the national development plan. To manage transitional changes, political parties' legislative functions should be enhanced to investigate and monitor

the executive to deter or check various types of corruption that might flourish as a result of weak legislation in parliament. Effective regulation of the conduct of political parties should be encouraged to enable parties to operate within the principles of the national constitution and their constitutions. The Political Parties Acts (2010) and the national constitution need to be simultaneously reviewed to ensure that party constitutions have specific and democratic provisions for party conventions.

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